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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
VS. ! 
RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
PETITION 
Case No. 
: Category 
FOR REHEARING 
20,740 
No. 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a Petition for Rehearing of a decision filed by the 
Supreme Court filed on January 11, 1988. Originally, this case 
was an appeal from convictions and judgments imposed for two 
counts of First Degree Murder, capital felonies; two counts of 
aggravated burglary, first degree felonies; and two counts of 
Conspiracy to Commit Murder, first degree felonies in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, the Honorable J. 
Robert Bullock, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The opinion of the court sets forth many of the relevant 
facts of the case, however, there are several additional facts 
which the opinion does not set forth which appellant deems 
relevant to the discussion and consideration of the issues. The 
trial court held two hearings at which the four alienists either 
testified in person or submitted written reports and test 
results. The January 28, 1985 hearing transcript contains 83 
pages of testimony from the four doctors who had examined the 
defendant and had observed him during his stay at the Utah State 
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Hospital including testimony from Mr. Richard Johnson, 
defendant's attorney. The testimony of the alienists goes into 
extensive detail in explaining the relationship of the diagnosis 
of defendant and the effect upon his competency. 
The January 28, 1985 transcript also contains the testimony 
of Mr. Johnson who related the difficulty he had encountered in 
attempting to discuss the matter with the defendant. (1/28/85 
transcript p. 81-83. 
The transcript of the April 2, 1985 hearing contains 56 
pages of testimony from three of the four doctors who submitted 
the report of March 19, 1985, concerning the competency of the 
defendant. In that testimony, the doctors explained in detail 
the reasons they felt the defendant's mental illness combined 
with his mental defect to prevent him from rationally 
understanding the criminal process. At each of the hearings, the 
doctors explained in detail how the condition of the defendant 
had changed from the November evaluation and attributed that 
change to the anoxic brain damage suffered during the December 
suicide attempt of the defendant. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Petition for rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 55, 
Utah Rules of the Supreme Court. In Brown v. Pickard, denying 
reh'g 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established 
the standard for granting a Petition for rehearing, stating: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be made. We 
must be convinced that the court failed to consider 
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some material point in the case, or that it erred in 
its conclusions. . . 11 P. at 512. 
Later, in Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (1913) this Court 
added: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter of 
right, and we have no desire to discourage the practice 
of filing petitions for rehearings in proper cases. 
When this court, however, has considered and decided 
all of the material questions involved in a case, a 
rehearing should not be applied for, unless we have 
misconstrued or overlooked some statute or decision 
which may affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or have either 
misapplied or overlooked something which materially 
affects the result . . . If there are some reasons, 
however, such as we have indicated above, or other good 
reasons, a petition for rehearing should be promptly 
filed and, if it is meritorious, its form will in no 
case be scrutinized by this court. Cummings v. 
Nielson, supra at 624. 
The argument section of this brief will establish that, applying 
these standards, this petition for rehearing is properly before 
the Court and should be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING DEFENDANT 
COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL 
The appellant urges the court to consider the evidence of 
his competency in light of the standard set forth in Dusky v. 
U.S., 362 US 402 (1960). This court found in its opinion, that 
there was a lack of explanation by the experts who testified that 
the defendant was not competent to stand trial as to how the 
"labels" of diagnosis related to his competency. The court also 
stated that "It is unclear what had changed since November, 
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other than the labels used to describe Laffertyfs condition." 
Additionally, in footnote 3 to the decision, the court stated ".. 
neither the examiner's reports nor their testimony indicate the 
suicide attempt and its consequences were the basis for their 
changed opinions." Defendant submits that reference to the 
transcripts of the two hearings contain substantial explanation 
by each of the examiners as to the effect of the suicide attempt 
and its consequences upon the condition of the defendant, 
including responses to questions by the court as well as from 
counsel for the state and defendant. In each of the hearings, 
each of the examiners explained how the loss of oxygen to 
defendant's brain during the suicide attempt caused a loss of 
both memory and I.Q. The I.Q. loss was at least 22 points and 
may have been as great as 37 points. (See addendum A page 48). 
The examiners explained in detail how the defendant's memory loss 
contributed to his incompetency. (See addendum A pages 1 to 58). 
The statutes of this state which are involved in the 
determination of competency, Utah Code Ann. 77-15-1 et. seq. and 
in particular, 77-15-5 which governs the hearing, require that 
the examiners place labels upon the condition of the defendant. 
In 77-15-5 refers to title 64 which is the mental health section 
of the code. 64-7-28(1) provides the definition of mental 
illness as follows: 
Mental illness means a psychiatric disorder as defined by 
the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders which substantially impairs a person's mental, 
emotional, behavioral, or related functioning. 
The statute requires that the examiners diagnose some 
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identifiable mental illness or defect. The examiners found 
defendant to suffer from an organic amnestic syndrome and a 
paranoid disorder. (See Addendum A page 17, 39, 42-43, and 55). 
The specific mental illness or defects diagnosed by the examiners 
are set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders. (See Addendum B, pages 112-113, and 195-198). 
The Dusky case requires the defendant have, in addition to 
orientation to time and place and some recollection of events, 
that he "has the present ability to consult with his lawyer with 
a reasonable degree of rational under standing--and whether he 
has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him." 363 US 402-403. The trial court's 
findings and this court's decision assume that the defendant had 
the present ability since he could choose to exercise that 
ability. Defendant submits that as a result of his mental 
illness and defect, he did not have the ability to so choose. 
Defendant's ability to choose as set forth by the examiners was 
limited by the mental illness and was demonstrated by his 
behavior at the April 2, 1985 hearing when questioned by Mr. 
Watson, the prosecutor. The defendant continuously took the 
Fifth Amendment as a basis for refusing to answer questions put 
to him by the prosecutor even though the court explained he had 
no basis to do so. A comparison of the defendant's conduct in 
the original competency hearing in October, 1984, his conduct at 
the preliminary hearing, and at the arraignment hearing with the 
conduct subsequent to his suicide attempt in December, 1984 
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clearly shows a marked difference in the defendant's level of 
participation and understanding of the questions of the court and 
counsel. The nonorganic mental illnesses by definition include 
situations such as the defendants, where the patient is 
physically fit and if able to choose to forgo irrational 
behavior, the patient would not be mentally ill. 
This court also ruled that the examiners "diagnoses were 
based upon the premise that Lafferty's religious beliefs and 
experiences did not accord with reality, an insupportable premise 
upon which the trial judge could not rely..."(Decision page 5). 
Defendant submits that the examiners must of necessity determine 
whether or not the experiences described by the defendant i.e., 
the commingling of his spirit with others at the State Hospital, 
or his belief that the only way of determining the authenticity 
of things to be through spiritual manifestations, are simply a 
system of religious beliefs or whether they are evidence of a 
delusional system. The court cites the case of United States v. 
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 and the case of United States v. Lee, 455 
U.S. 252, as prohibiting evaluation of religious beliefs. 
Defendant submits that neither of the cited cases prevent the 
psychiatric and psychological experts from considering whether 
the beliefs are delusional or simply beliefs of the defendant. 
As Dr. Van Austin testified in the April 2, 1985 hearing, he did 
not feel that the defendant was incompetent in November, 1984f 
even though he found the defendant to have a very strong system 
of religious beliefs. Of course, at that time the doctor was 
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aware of the defendant's claim to have received the revelation 
containing the "hit list". He stated that "as a result of the 
anoxic brain damage, that system of very fervent religious 
beliefs has deteriorated into a system of religious delusions". 
(Addendum A page 49). To deny the defendant who happens to have a 
mental illness which involves some religious fixation or delusion 
the opportunity to have his mental condition considered because 
it happens to involve religious matters denies that category of 
mentally ill persons equal protection of the law. Under the 
court's reasoning, they would never be deemed to be incompetent 
unless there was some additional condition or behavior which 
could be then adequately considered. 
In this case, defendant submits that the quality as well as 
the quantity of information available to the four examiners who 
gave the opinion that defendant was not competent far outweighed 
the information and testimony provided by Dr. Thorne. That gap 
between the two opinions constitutes, at the very least, a 
clearly erroneous decision by the trial court. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING DEFENDANT 
TO DEFEND HIMSELF 
This court found that after defendant recovered his 
competence, he had failed to exercise his right to waive counsel 
when questioned by the trial court. As supported by the record, 
throughout the prior proceedings the various judges who presided 
at the preliminary hearing, at the arraignment proceeding, and 
the trial judge himself had in detail questioned defendant about 
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his waiver of his right to counsel and had in fact, made findings 
of the "knowing and intentional" waiver of that right. If, as 
the court has found, the defendant was as competent at the time 
of trial in April, 1985, as he was in the fall of 1984 during the 
time when he was acting as his own counsel, then there had been a 
competent waiver of that right. Additionally, the court was 
informed by his counsel, Mr. Johnson, as to the defendant's 
desire in that matter. Defendant submits that under the case of 
State v. Penderville, 272 P2d 195, and the case of Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806, defendant should have been allowed to 
represent himself. The defendant urges the court to reconsider 
its ruling on this point. As set forth earlier, the reason 
defendant wished to represent himself was twofold. First, he did 
not trust the system and did not wish to relinquish control of 
his defense to Mr. Johnson, a person the examiners testified the 
defendant felt to be part of the system persecuting him. 
(Addendum A page 11). Secondly, he believed that if he conducted 
the defense, his spirit could mingle with the spirits of the 
judge, prosecutor and jury and the truth would therefore be 
discerned. (Addendum A, page 46). If the defendant is not 
incompetent as a result of the above beliefs, then he should be 
allowed to present his case to the jury in the fashion and manner 
which he believed to be in order. By forcing counsel upon him, 
the court created a situation where the defendant and counsel 
were at odds as to the defense of the case and which was 
demonstrated in the presence of the jury creating the situation 
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which occurred in McKaskle v. Wiggins, 104 S. Ct. 946, previously 
cited to the court in which his appointed counsel was not able to 
effectively present the defense and the defendant was not able to 
defend himself. 
POINT III 
THE COURT MISAPPLIED A PRINCIPAL OF LAW IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
PROSECUTORS CLOSING ARGUMENT DURING THE PENALTY PHASE WAS 
HARMLESS ERROR. 
At the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial of the 
defendant, the prosecutor, in closing argument, stated: 
He will kill again. He will murder. He will take 
another human life. The only thing, ladies and 
gentlemen, and believe me I know exactly what I am 
saying to you, because I am going to shift my burden in 
a moment, but, the only thing between ... him and his 
next victim is you. The only thing that is going to 
save the life of the next victim is you. I can't do it 
anymore. 
As stated by Associate Chief Justice, Daniel I. Stewart, 
this argument of the prosecutor was improper because it was 
"plainly wrong." Justice Stewart further set forth the reason 
that the prosecutorfs statement was wrong: 
In a capital case, the only alternative to a death 
sentence is a life sentence. Whether an inmate may 
ever be paroled from such a sentence depends upon the 
decision of the Utah Board of Pardons, and its decision 
would necessarily be based in part upon the assessment 
of the likelihood that an inmate will not be likely to 
commit an act of violence if paroled. The prosecutor 
simply put the matter to the jury as a false 
alternative: either return a verdict of death or the 
defendant will kill again. 
The United States Supreme Court in Gardner v. Flordia, 430 
U. S. 349 (1977) declared, "It is of vital importance to the 
defendant and the community that any decision to impose the death 
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sentence be, and appear to be, based upon reason rather than 
caprice or emotion." This Court in the case of State v. Brown, 
607 P.2d 261 (1980) stated that the prosecutor must use 
"scrupulous care" in a capital homicide case. In the Brown case, 
this Court found that the prosecutor had committed prejudicial 
error in the penalty phase of the trial of the defendant in that 
case because of ignoring a court's admonition not to use hearsay 
on hearsay evidence. The complaint of hearsay on hearsay 
evidence was the testimony of Wayne Watson, a deputy Utah County 
attorney, who stated under oath as a witness, that a Mr. Bingham 
had testified in a prior trial against the same defendant, Brown, 
that "I just head shot to F for messing with my brother." 
The record of the proceedings of the trial wherein Mr. Bingham 
was a witness against the defendant revealed that the actual 
testimony given by Mr. Bingham regarding his memory of a 
statement made by the defendant, Brown in the prior case, was, "I 
shot them both in the head, " or "I head shot both of them," or 
something to that effect. In the Brown case, this Court found 
the error of the prosecution to be prejudicial because the 
hearsay on hearsay lacked probative value and was introduced 
contrary to a court's admonition. When one examines the 
difference between the statements constituting the hearsay on 
hearsay, there is very little difference. Mr. Bingham's actual 
testimony and Mr. Watson's recollection of it both indicate that 
Mr. Brown stated that he had head shot or shot "both of them." 
The only real difference is Mr. Watson's addition of the words 
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"for messing with my brother." 
If this Court can determine that the error committed by the 
prosecution in the Brown case was prejudicial error requiring a 
remand for imposition of a life sentence, then certainly the 
improper and false statement of Mr. Watson with respect to Mr. 
Laffertyfs ability to kill again falls well within the reason for 
the ruling of prejudicial error in State v. Brown. Applying 
those principals in State v. Brown should compel this Court to 
find prejudicial error in the present case regarding the 
prosecutor's false statement quoted herein above. 
POINT IV 
THE ALLOWANCE OF EVIDENCE OF VIOLENT CRIMES WHICH HAD NOT RESULTED 
IN CONVICTIONS DURING THE PENALTY PHASE OF THE DEFENDANT'S TRIAL 
CONSTITUTED UNFAIR PREJUDICE. 
The Court in this case held "that the sentencing body — be 
it judge or jury -- may not rely on other violent criminal 
activity as an aggravating factor supporting a death penalty 
unless it is first convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
accused did commit the other crime." To implement the rule, the 
Court went on to add two requirements to the penalty phase of 
capital trials. Then this Court held that the defendant's 
commission of violent acts while he was incarcerated at the Utah 
County Jail was proven beyond a reasonable doubt based upon 
"undisputed eyewitness testimony." Defendant argues that the 
principal of law which the Court ignores in this type of 
reasoning is that the defendant was not accorded the protection 
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which he has a right to rely upon as an accused. That is, when a 
person is accused of a crime, he then is shrouded with a 
presumption of innocence and a burden is placed upon the State to 
prove each and every element of the charge against the accused 
beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the trier of 
fact. He has the right to confront witnesses and to call 
witnesses on his own behalf and to assert any defenses which may 
be available to him under the law. In a proceeding such as 
occurred in the penalty phase of the trial of this case, the 
defendant was never accused until the prosecution introduced 
evidence of his violent acts at the jail during the penalty 
phase. Even at that time he was not formally accused, given the 
opportunity for arraignment and preliminary hearing. He was 
denied his right of confrontation and certainly cannot be said to 
have been shrouded with the presumption of innocence. The State 
was not required to put on evidence to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt each and every element of the "non-charged" crime. For 
this reason, the language in the case of State v. McCormick 272 
Ind. 272, 397 N.E. 2d 276 (1979) as decided by Justice Stewart in 
this Court's opinion is better reasoned and should be strictly 
followed. The Court in McCormick stated: 
The procedure to be utilized in this case as provided 
for by statute and case law will be, in fact, two 
trials. The defendant will first be tried to a jury 
for the killing of Douglass Overby. If he is 
convicted, a sentencing hearing will take place. At 
this sentencing hearing, the defendant will, in 
essence, be tried for the murder of Harold Lewis. This 
hearing will be before the same jury which will have 
just recently convicted the defendant of another, 
unrelated murder. The trial court noted that if 
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McCormick were tried in an actual criminal trial for 
the murder of Harold Lewis, any evidence relating to 
the Overby killing would be inadmissable in the State's 
case in chief. Likewise, no evidence of the Lewis 
killing may be admitted in this case in the trial of 
Count I, the Overby killing. Thus, the effect of the 
statutory procedure in the present case is obvious: 
defendant McCormick would be fully tried on two 
separate, unrelated charges before the same jury. He 
would be tried on the second count to the jury which 
has been undeniably prejudiced by having convicted him 
of an unrelated murder. State v. McCormick, 272 Ind. 
272, 397 N.E. 2d 276 (1979T 
The reasoning of the McCormick case applies with equal force 
to the sentencing procedure in this case. Defendant contends 
that this Court misapplied a principal of law and should have 
found that the prosecution's use of uncharged, unconvicted 
criminal activity was unfairly prejudicial and when coupled with 
the prosecutor's misstatement discussed in the next previous 
point, unduly prejudiced the jury and likely resulted in their 
verdict of death rather than life. 
POINT V 
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF PREJUDICIAL PHOTOGRAPHS AND THE USE OF 
VIDEO TAPE AT THE PENALTY PHASE OF THE TRIAL UNDULY PREJUDICED 
THE JURY. 
This Court concluded that during the guilt phase of the 
trial of Ron Lafferty the "trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting the photograph into evidence." The Court set forth the 
reasons for the holding among which were that the pictures were 
"quite gruesome;" that they were not "merely crime-scene 
photographs, that pictures of bodies, conveying little 
information beyond the fact that the victims died violent and 
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bloody deaths;fr that the body of the child had been "repositioned 
in the crib so that the gaping neck wound and blood-covered face 
and body could be seen;" that the "emotional impact of these 
photographs was strong, and they had no unusual probative value." 
The Court then concluded that even though the admission of the 
photographs was erroneous, their use in the trial was harmless 
because the "other evidence against Lafferty was so overwhelming 
that there is little or no likelihood that the outcome of either 
the guilt or the penalty phase of the trial was affected by the 
admission of the photographs. 
In capital cases, it is of vital importance to the defendant 
that any decision to impose the death sentence be based on reason 
rather than caprice or emotion. This Court has emphasized that 
the prosecutor must use scrupulous care in a capital homicide 
case. If the State were permitted during the penalty phase to 
use as evidence in aggravation, material that would be 
insufficiently probative to support a conviction in the guilt 
phase, then there is a chance that this material might be used by 
the sentencing body as the basis for imposing death. Gardner v. 
Flordia, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 
(1980); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (1981). It is defendant's 
contention that taken alone, each one of the complained of errors 
committed by the prosecution, i.e. inflammatory photographs, 
false statements of the prosecutor, or evidence of crimes without 
conviction, might not persuade the jury to impose the death 
sentence. However, when all three of these unduly prejudiced 
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acts of the prosecutor are combined in the death penalty phase of 
the trial proceedings, the cumulative effect of them must 
certainly have a much greater impact upon the minds of the jury 
when coupled with the permissable evidence produced in the guilt 
phase of the trial such that the jury rendered a verdict of death 
rather than a verdict of life. To allow the cumulative affect of 
these three unduly prejudicial acts of the prosecution to stand 
during the penalty phase of the trial ignores the principals of 
law announced in the Gardner, Brown and Wood cases as set forth 
herein above. Defendant contends that absent the unduly 
prejudicial acts or erroneous evidence which were allowed in the 
penalty phase of the trial, the jury would not have reached the 
verdict of death. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Appellant respectfully petitions 
this Court to reconsider its decision in this case and remand the 
matter for proceedings to determine the present competency of the 
defendant or, in the alternative order a new trial wherein 
defendant is allowed to represent himself. Further, that the 
Court remand the matter to the District Court for a new penalty 
hearing. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this \fi^ day of February, 1988. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing to the office of David L. 
Wilkinson, Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid this jfi Q^ 4 day of February, 
1988. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY, 
Defendant. 
Criminal No. 9303 
ABSTRACTS FROM TRAN-
SCRIPT OF HEARING: com-
prising the Testimony 
of the Witnesses: 
DR. ROBERT J. HOWELL; 
DR. VAN AUSTIN; 
DR. C. JESS GROESBECK; and 
DR. D. EUGENE THORNE. 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that the above-entitled 
matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
J. Robert Bullock, Judge of the above-entitled court, on 
the 2nd day of April, 1985, commencing at the hour of 1:05 
o'clock p.m., at Room 310, County Building, Provo, Utah; 
That there appeared as counsel repre-
senting plaintiff, State of Utah, WAYNE B. WATSON, ESQ., 
Deputy Utah County Attorney, MS. BEVERLY RAMSEY, Deputy Utah 
County Attorney, and NOALL T. WOOTTON, ESQ., Utah County 
Attorney; and as counsel representing defendant, RICHARD B. 
JOHNSON, ESQ. 
WHEREFORE, the following proc( 
had, as abstracted from the reporter's notes and cDmpi 
the testimony of the witnesses, DR. ROBERT J. HOWELL; % R 7 VKW 
BLED 
AUSTIN; DR. C. JESS GROESBECK; and DR. D. EUGENE M ^ r ^ C c u n v'. K< 
1 Q Fine. But at least with regard to this paranoia 
2 he believes that he's a subject of a persecution or, I 
3 interchange the word, "prosecution"? 
4 A Yes. And, I'm not sure you should, but you did. 
5 Q And he knows where he is today, doesn't he? He 
6 knows he's in Judge Bullock's courtroom? 
7 A I believe that. 
8 Q And he knows that I'm the prosecutor, representing 
9 the State of Utah? 
10 A I haven't asked him, but I would assume so. 
11 Q And he understands that there's a jury trial system 
12 in this country and a jury would be imposed in this particular 
13 instance, does he not? 
14 A I'm not sure of that point. I'm not positive. 
15 Q Ke knows who Mr. Johnson is? 
16 A Very well. 
17 Q And he knows that Mr. Johnson has been provided, 
18 does he not, as far as you know, to help him if he so desires? 
19 A I believe he knows that. He also believes that you 
20 and Mr. Johnson are in league with each other. 
21 I Q In the same camp? 
22 A That's right. 
23 Q Would you be surprised if he told me just a half-
24 hour or so ago that he perhaps didn't believe that? 
25 A Yes, I wouldn't be surprised at all. He's putten 
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Q Do you believe he has the condition of amnesia, 
in any respect? 
A At least amnesia. 
Q With regard to the events of July 24, 1984, do you 
believe that? 
A I think that it is very fuzzy for him, yes. 
Q Now, if someone reconstructed that memory for him 
and provided him all the circumstances, dates, places, times 
and who was present during the commission of these crimes, 
and so forth, he could have that memory reconstructed for him. 
Couldn't he? 
A I'm not sure I would agree with that. There's a 
possibility. I'm not sure how long it would last. 
Q All right. If he told me on January 28th, the last 
1 Manual of -- let see -- in the current Manual of Mental Dis-
2 orders, which substantially impairs a person's emotional --
3 mental, emotional behavior or related functioning.n That's 
4 the legal definition. That's the only legal definition of 
5 mental illness I know of in the State. 
6 Now, what we were saying there is that he does 
7 suffer from a mental illness; in fact, two: an organic 
8 amnestic syndrome and a paranoid disorder. And then we went 
9 on to list the criteria that would allow us to, hopefully, 
10 the Judge would order involuntary treatment for it. 
11 Q All right. So he has two mental illnesses, and one 
12 is an am --
13 A Amnestic. 
14 Q -- amnestic condition? 
15 A That's correct. And maybe more than that, but it's 
16 at least that, 
17 Q The other one is the one we are talking about, the 
18 paranoid delusional system? 
19 A That is my belief. 
20 MR. WATSON: That's all the questions I 
21 have, your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Now, do you have questions, 
23 Mr. Johnson? 
24 MR. JOHNSON: Yes, your Honor, I do. 
25 THE COURT: You may cross examine. 
1 CROSS EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. JOHNSON: 
3
 Q Dr. Howell, I just want to ask you some questions 
4
 so that the record is clear as to exactly what you have indi-
5
 cated. In the letter of March 19th, which you joined in, 
6
 you talk about a return to a pervasive religious attitude. 
7
 Would you describe and define that for us, please? 
8
 A Are you using my letter or the — 
9
 Q I'm using the Hospital's letter. 
10
 J A Joint-letter. Okay. As he, as time has gone on, 
and as you don't see the organic symptoms quite as much as 
you did, he has become more religiously oriented. In my 
judgment the religion has taken on a delusional nature. He 
14
 I talks about the comingling of.his spirt with other spirits on 
15
 I the ward. He is become, has become more adamant about the 
only true way of determining the authenticity of things is 
17
 | through spiritual manifestations. And in general he has 
18 I become turned more to a religious orientation. But he doesn't 
19
 I have the skills that he had before the hanging incident. 
Q Now, does the religiosity that is pointed to in the 
letter of March 19th form in your opinion the base of the 
delusional system? 
23
 A Well, I think the religiosity is the way the delu-
24
 J sional system is being expressed 
Q Okay. Now, does Ron have an attitude, in essence, 
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25 
1 appreciate his predicament and participate, does the person 
2 have to have some realistic sense of charges, of how it's 
3 going to impact him? 
4 A I believe that. That's why I quoted the Dusky 
5 Standard in my report. 
6 Q Now, Whereas Ron can see and hear what's going on 
7 around him, when you consider, with his paranoia that you 
8 have found and the delusional systems that you have talked 
9 about, can he rationally, in your opinion, understand the 
10 trial, the procedures dealing with lawyers, judges and pro-
11 secutors? 
12 A I have an opinion on that. 
13 Q And, what's that opinion? 
14 A It is that he cannot. 
15 Q Now, I notice from the records of the Hospital that 
16 aside from the matters which are indicated in the report, that] 
17 there has been noted something that is referred to as a 
18 "focal seizure." 
19 A That's correct. Happened on March 21. 
20 Q Would you tell the Court what a focal seizure is? 
21 A Yes. "Focal" means localized. Focal infection is 
22 a localized infection. So, a focal seizure means that it was 
23 circumscribed or localized to one area. 
24 Do you want me to give a little history on my 
25 concern about this? 
1 people perceive him that way, too. 
2 Q Now, just as a gauge: we're not talking with Mr. 
3 Lafferty about some small difference with the rest of us of 
4 how we perceive this case and his part in it, are we? 
5 A Not ±r\ my judgment. 
6 Q Are we talking about a very substantial significant 
7 departure from this consentual --
8 A Validation. 
9 Q -- validation that you talked about? 
10 A I think so. 
11 Q Okay. Now, in your mind does the way Ron perceives 
12 this proceeding and his role in it and the consequences even 
13 closely approach what most people would perceive? 
14
 A No, it does not. He said he was going to use a 
15 defense of silence. 
16 Q Okay. Now, that perception, based upon paranoia and 
17 the delusional system and the organic problem you've talked 
18 about, — 
19 A Yes. 
20
 J Q — is not a result or -- Let me rephrase the ques-
tion. His rationality is not simply based upon the way he 
has chosen to live his life, but you believe is a result of 
a mental illness and organic problems. Correct? 
21 
22 
23 
24
 A That was, likely, involuntarily came upon him. 
25 Q Okay. And it is not a choice of life, it is a resultt 
1 Q Now, whether or not he agrees with that concept 
2 or whether he should be subjected to that concept, at least 
3 he understands that's the game we are trying to play here. 
4 A That's correct. 
5 Q And, he knows who Mr. Johnson is. 
6 A He knows who Mr. Johnson is, that's correct. 
7 Q And, he knows that Kr. Johnson is a defense lawyer 
8 and may be provided to help him if he wants that help. 
9 A In those specific words, that is correct. 
10 Q And, he knows, does he not, that the possible 
11 punishment for the two murders charged at least is capital, 
12 or death? 
13 A He knows that. 
14 Q And, he knows that the State is trying to pursue 
15 conviction for all of the crimes that we have charged him 
16 with, doesn't he? 
17 A He knows that. 
18 J Q Now, are you of the opinion — well, I guess you 
are because you signed the letter, that he suffers from a 
paranoid delusional system? 
21 A That's correct. 
22 Q And, he thinks that the State is part of that systemj 
23 that18 persecuting him, doesn't he? 
24 A The State and others, correct. 
25 Q Perhaps, even yourself and the Hospital staff 
19 
20 
1 quences are. But then I feel that he further needs to have 
2 a rational understanding of that. 
3 Q And that, as I understand it, is where you say 
4 things break down. He understands physically where ie is in 
5 time, but how he interprets it because of the religious 
6 delusional system and the paranoia, that's the off-track 
7 thought patterns that you described in your definition of 
8 rationality. Correct? 
9 A In this particular case, yes, sir. 
10 Q Okay. Now, I don't want to have to go over the 
11 whole report, but I need to ask you a couple of questions. 
12 You are not basing your report and your opinion solely on 
13 any particular aspect.for instance, you don't think that the 
14 fact that his IQ dropped 22 point is alone sufficient to find 
15 him incompetent to proceed? 
16 A No, I do not. 
17 Q You do not think the amnesia standing by itself is 
18 sufficient to indicate that Mr. Lafferty ought not to proceed 
19 to trial? 
20 A No. Amnesia per se does not preclude competence. 
21 Q All right. It is a combination of all of these 
22 elements together upon which you base your opinion. Is that 
23 correct? 
24 A More than that, Mr. Johnson. It's the change. As 
25 you are aware, we have been familiar with him over a period 
1 of months now. And, I certainly in November strongly felt 
2 that although he had a strong system of religious beliefs 
3 hich were quite different than many other peoples1 systems 
4
 of religious beliefs, that this did not represent a delusional] 
5
 system. And, at this point in time I still believe that that 
6
 did not represent a delusional system at that point in time. 
7
 However, I believe that since the anoxious insult of the 
8
 hanging, this paranoid delusional system has developed. And, 
9
 I feel that this does interfere with his ability to meaning-
10
 fully function, either independently in a courtroom or with 
11
 the aid of counsel in a courtroom. And, although I believe 
12 that he knows the consequences of what may happen in the 
13
 courtroom, he certainly does not at all understand the signi-
14 ficance of those consequences. 
15 Q And then as you indicated, his memory and the way 
16
 he interacts with people, that comes and goes; he has dif-
17
 ferent problems with memory, he might recall something that 
18
 happens today or he might not, if you asked him a week from 
19
 now. Correct? Or, even tomorrow. 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q Now, just so I understand it, from reading the 
22 report, that is the March 19th letter to Judge Bullock, I 
23 take it that because of all of the things you outlined: you 
24 talk about the religious delusional system, you talk about 
25 the blurred ego boundaries, you talk about the unable to 
1 aware, equal — or, a lot of precedents where people were 
2 allowed to do that; they are allowed to defend themselves no 
3 matter how badly they shouldn't do it. 
4 Q But, wouldn't you say that was not rational? 
5 A I would say that --
6 Q In fact it was irrational? 
7 A I would say that may represent very poor judgment. 
8 If the person had a good reason for making that decision, 
9 and I have seen people that, you know, although I've said to 
10 myself: god, this is a stupid decision they made based on 
11 their religious beliefs or beliefs in constitutional law, or 
12 whatever, say: well, okay, he's got a right to do that. It's 
13 a bad decision, but he has a right to do that; if that 
14 decision is, to me is a logical decision. But, if that 
15 decision were to be based on the belief that by defending 
16 himself his spirit will communicate with your spirit and the 
17 jury's spirit and His Honors spirit and it will all be worked 
18 out by God; there we fall down. That's beyond what I'm wil-
19 ling to believe is rational. 
20 Q All right. Can't that same person say: well, I'm 
21 going to put myself in the hands of competent, experienced 
22 defense counsel and sit back and let defense counsel run the 
23 show; if he wanted to? 
24 A If that person were to do that and be able to make 
25 consistent, logical -- or, give consistent, logical input to 
1 vations. 
2 Q Okay. Now, one last point where it's almost like 
3 the skulp-monkey trial, here, we're talking about this 
4 "rationality;" that, even today Mr. Watson talked about the 
5 world being flat and the world being round; but, in science 
6 today we have people who thing entirely different things 
7 about quantum physics or about blackholes or about new 
8 scientific things. Correct? 
9 A That's correct. 
10 Q But, they have a means by which they get to their 
11 end objective that is accessible. Other people might reject 
12 their theories just like in the old days they rejected 
13 theories about astronomy, astrology and everything else. 
14 Correct? 
15 A That's correct . 
16 Q But it does, the key to all of that is is that you 
17 are dealing with some kind of logic and rationality, although 
18 you might be on the wrong premise that other people can at 
19 least see. Correct? 
20 A I believe that is correct. 
21 Q Now, with Mr. Lafferty, does he have that kind of 
22 understandable consistent point to get: to the end that he 
23 gets to? 
24 A I do not believe that he does. 
26 Q Do you think Mr. Lafferty is just simply a religious 
1 fanatic? 
2 A Well, I don't want to use those words. 
3 Q Well, I'm saying that his, his religious delusional 
4 system you talk about is not just simply a choice of beliefs, 
5 it is influenced by a mental illness; is it not? 
6 A As I testified a few minutes ago: I think he has 
7 a system of, a very strong system of religious beliefs which 
8 have existed for a number of years, and they existed when we 
9 previously evaluated him. And, I went on to testify that I 
10 believe at this point, probably as a result of the anoxic 
11 brain damage, that system of very fervent religious beliefs 
12 has deteriorated into a system of religious delusions. 
13 MR. JOHNSON: All right. That's all. 
14 MR. WATSON: I have no further question. 
15 THE COURT: Is there any reason to sus-
16 pect that the situation will be different in a month, six 
17 months, a year or something of that nature? If it's deterior-
18 ated to this point and from the time of the attempted suicide, 
19 what is there to indicate that there would be any change in 
20 the future? 
21 THE WITNESS: Your Honor, his condition 
22 certainly has improved from December 29th. At first, very 
23 slowly; once at the State Hospital, it was improved, you know, 
24 more. 
25 THE COURT: What condition? 
1 Court? 
2 A Yes, I believe that. 
3 Q And, he recognizes, does he not, that if he so 
4 desires, he could confer with Mr. Johnson and they could 
5 work together in an attorney-client relationship? 
6 A Yes. I think factually and consciously he is aware 
7 of those possibilities, yes. 
8 Q And you agree, apparently, that he has or he suffers 
9 from a mental illness? 
10 A Yes, I do. 
11 Q And, what is that? 
12 A I believe he suffers from an organic amnestic 
13 syndrome and an atypical paranoid reaction. 
14 Q Do you agree with the characterization of that 
15 "atypical paranoid reaction11 as a paranoid delusional system? 
16 A Yes, I do. 
17 Q And, that's evidenced by his concern or his religi-
18 ostic belief, is it not? 
19 A That's where it's primarily manifest, yes. But I 
20 must add, it's not just because he has a strong fixed belief 
21 system. The precise point is, the inability to rationally 
22 utilize his thinking within his belief system to confront 
23 the facts that are facing him. 
24 Q Now, by that you are saying that he believes he's 
25 above the law of the State of Utah, don't you? 
1 discuss in his opinion whether or not certain witnesses are 
2 telling the truth, and so forth. 
3 A He would have difficulty with that, but with re-
4 construction and help from a counsel, if we are just talking 
5 about memory and the memory deficit he has, that could be 
6 accounted for. I mean, that could be, that could go ahead, 
7
 right. 
8 Q But, you are saying because of this paranoid 
9 delusional system he just may not want to do that, may throw 
10 the whole system out the window and say: I'm not subject to 
11 the system, I'm not going to cooperate. 
12 A Right. Part of his delusional system is a messianic 
13 identification with his role, as he has a pervasive perception) 
14 that he, for example, is not on trial, the system; and, 
15 that's virtually everybody who's involved in it, including 
16 the hospital, including the court process, the court indivi-
17 duals involved and everyone that's taking place. 
18 Q Now, I didn't ask you this before, but let me make 
19 sure I understand you correctly. You are not of the opinion 
20 that he is mentally defective, i.e.: he has a substantial 
21 reduction in IQ such as would cause him to be unable to 
22
 assist counsel. Right? 
^ A Yes. No, it wouldn't be because of that, no. 
24 MR. WATSON: Thank you. That's all 
25 MR. JOHNSON: Nothing further. 
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copy three-dimensional figures, assemble blocks, or arrange sticks 
in specific designs) 
(4) personality change, i.e., alteration or accentuation of premorbid 
traits 
D. State of consciousness not clouded (i.e., does not meet the criteria for 
Delirium or Intoxication, although these may be superimposed). 
E. Either (1) or (2): 
(1) evidence from the history, physical examination, or laboratory 
tests, of a specific organic factor that is judged to be etiologically 
related to the disturbance 
(2) in the absence of such evidence, an organic factor necessary for 
the development of the syndrome can be presumed if conditions 
other than Organic Mental Disorders have been reasonably excluded 
and if the behavioral change represents cognitive impairment in a 
variety of areas 
Amnestic Syndrome 
The essential feature is impairment in short- and long-term memory occurring in 
a normal state of consciousness (i.e., not clouded). The disturbance is attributed 
to a specific organic factor. Amnestic Syndrome is not diagnosed if memory im-
pairment exists in the context of clouded consciousness (Delirium) or in associa-
tion with a more general loss of intellectual abilities (Dementia). 
The individual with an Amnestic Syndrome has both an ongoing inability 
to learn new material (short-term memory deficit; anterograde amnesia) and an 
inability to recall material that was known in the past (long-term memory deficit; 
retrograde amnesia). The former is conventionally assessed by requiring the in-
dividual to remember several unrelated words or a short paragraph after a brief 
(usually 5-15-minute) interval of distraction. The latter is tested by asking ques-
tions about events of the past such as birthplace, family, schooling, vocation, 
major historical events, the names of recent presidents, etc. The individual with 
an Amnestic Syndrome has difficulty with both of these operations of memory. 
Events of the very remote past, however, are often better recalled than more 
recent events. For example, an individual may remember in vivid detail a hospi-
tal stay that took place a decade before examination, but may have no idea that 
he or she is currently in the hospital. So-called "immediate memory" (e.g., digit 
span), however, is not impaired in Amnestic Syndrome. 
Associated features. A significant degree of amnesia nearly always results in 
disorientation. Confabulation, the recitation of imaginary events to fill in gaps 
in memory, is often observed, and when present tends to disappear with time. 
Most individuals with this syndrome lack insight into their memory deficit, and 
may explicitly deny it, despite evidence to the contrary. Others acknowledge a 
problem, but appear unconcerned. Apathy, lack of initiative, and emotional 
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blandness are common. Although the individual is superficially friendly and 
agreeable, his or her affect is shallow. 
When Amnestic Syndrome is the result of Alcohol Dependence and vitamin 
deficiency (see Alcohol Amnestic Disorder, p. 136), other neurological complica-
tions of alcohol ingestion and malnutrition, such as peripheral neuropathy, cere-
bellar ataxia, etc., may also be observed. 
Course. The mode of onset depends on the etiology. In most cases it is fairly 
sudden. The subsequent course, also a function of the etiology, is usually one of 
chronicity. 
Impairment. Impairment in social and occupational functioning is usually 
moderate to severe. 
Complications. Any complications are the direct result of the individual's 
memory impairment. For example, the individual's forgetting to extinguish a 
lighted cigarette may cause a fire. 
Etiological factors. Amnestic Syndrome may result from any pathological 
process that causes bilateral damage to certain diencephalic and medial temporal 
structures (e.g., mammillary bodies, fornix, hippocampal complex). Examples in-
clude head trauma, surgical intervention, hypoxia, infarction in the territory of 
the posterior cerebral arteries, and herpes simplex encephalitis. The most com-
mon form of Amnestic Syndrome is that associated with thiamine deficiency and 
chronic use of alcohol. 
Prevalence. The syndrome is apparently uncommon. 
Differential diagnosis. Delirium and Dementia also involve memory impair-
ment. In Delirium, however, there is also a clouding of consciousness; and in 
Dementia, there are other major intellectual deficits as well. 
In Factitious Disorder with Psychological Symptoms, memory testing often 
yields inconsistent results. Furthermore, there is no organic etiologic factor. 
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Paranoid Disorders 
The essential features are persistent persecutory delusions or delusional jeal-
ousy, not due to any other mental disorder, such as a Schizophrenic, Schizo-
phreniform, Affective, or Organic Mental Disorder. The Paranoid Disorders 
include Paranoia, Shared Paranoid Disorder, and Acute Paranoid Disorder. 
The boundaries of this group of disorders and their differentiation from 
such other disorders as severe Paranoid Personality Disorder and Schizophrenia, 
Paranoid Type, are unclear. 
The persecutory delusions may be simple or elaborate and usually involve a 
single theme or series of connected themes, such as being conspired against, 
cheated, spied upon, followed, poisoned or drugged, maliciously maligned, 
harassed, or obstructed in the pursuit of long-term goals. Small slights may be 
exaggerated and become the focus of a delusional system. 
There may be only delusional jealousy ("conjugal paranoia"), in which 
an individual may become convinced without due cause, that his or her mate is 
unfaithful. Small bits of "evidence/' such as disarrayed clothing or spots on 
the sheets, may be collected and used to justify the delusion. 
Associated features. Common associated features include resentment and 
anger, which may lead to violence. Grandiosity and ideas or delusions of 
reference are common. Often there is social isolation, seclusiveness, or eccen-
tricities of behavior. Suspiciousness, either generalized or focused on certain 
individuals, is common. Letter writing, complaining about various injustices, 
and instigation of legal action are frequent. These individuals rarely seek treat-
ment, and often are brought for care by associates, relatives, or governmental 
agencies as a result of the individuals' angry or litigious activities. 
Age at onset. Generally middle or late adult life. 
Course. The course of Paranoia and Shared Paranoid Disorder is chronic 
with few, if any, exacerbations or periods of remission. The course of Acute 
Paranoid Disorder, by definition, is limited to six months' duration. 
Impairment* Impairment in daily functioning is rare. Intellectual and occu-
pational functioning are usually preserved, even when the disorder is chronic. 
Social and marital functioning, on the other hand, are often severely impaired. 
Complications. None. 
Predisposing factors. Immigration, emigration, deafness, and other severe 
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stresses may predispose to the development of a Paranoid Disorder. Individuals 
with Paranoid or Schizoid Personality Disorders may also have a greater likeli-
hood of developing a Paranoid Disorder. 
Prevalence. Paranoid Disorders are thought to be rare. However, Paranoia 
involving delusional jealousy may be more common. 
Sex ratio and familial pattern. No information. 
Differential diagnosis. In Organic Delusional Syndromes, particularly those 
induced by amphetamines, persecutory delusions are common. 
In Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type, or Schizophreniform Disorder, there are 
certain symptoms, such as incoherence, marked loosening of associations, prom-
inent hallucinations, and bizarre delusions (e.g., delusions of control, thought 
broadcasting, withdrawal, or insertion), that are not present in Paranoid Dis-
orders. Although delusions that others are attempting to control the individual's 
behavior are common in both Paranoid and Schizophrenic Disorders, the expe-
rience of being controlled by alien forces suggests Schizophrenia or Schizo-
phreniform Disorder. In addition, delusions in Schizophrenia are more likely 
to be fragmented and multiple rather than systematized, as in Paranoid Dis-
orders. 
In Paranoid Personality Disorder there may be paranoid ideation or patho-
logical jealousy, but there are no delusions. Whenever an individual with a 
Paranoid Disorder has a preexisting Personality Disorder, including Paranoid 
Personality Disorder, the Personality Disorder should be listed on Axis II, 
followed! by the phrase "Premorbid" in parentheses. 
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297.10 Paranoia 
The essential feature is the insidious development of a Paranoid Disorder with 
a permanent and unshakable delusional system accompanied by preservation of 
clear and orderly thinking. Frequently the individual considers himself or herself 
endowed with unique and superior abilities. Chronic forms of "conjugal para-
noia" and Involutional Paranoid State should be classified here. 
pltfnortk criteria Ipr ttranola 
A Meets the criteria for Paranoid tHsonter (p. 196). 
a A chronic and stable petwcutory delusional syitem ot W J*ut #x
 t 
months'duration, 
C Does not meet the criteria lor Shared Paranoid Okotrkn 
297.30 Shared Paranoid Disorder 
The essential feature is a persecutory delusional system that develops as a 
result of a close relationship with another person who already has a disorder 
with persecutory delusions. The delusions are at least partly shared. Usually, if 
the relationship with the other person is interrupted, the delusional beliefs will 
diminish or disappear. In the past this disorder has been termed Folie a deux, 
although in rare cases, more than two persons may be involved. 
298.30 Acute Paranoid Disorder 
The essential feature is a Paranoid Disorder of less than six months' duration. 
It is most commonly seen in individuals who have experienced drastic changes 
in their environment, such as immigrants, refugees, prisoners of war, inductees 
into military services, or people leaving home for the first time. The onset is 
usually relatively sudden and the condition rarely becomes chronic. 
